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Abstract—In large distributed information systems, alert
correlation systems are necessary to handle the huge amount
of elementary security alerts and to identify complex multi-
step attacks within the flow of low level events and alerts. In
this paper, we show that, once a human expert has provided an
action tree derived from an attack tree, a fully automated trans-
formation process can generate exhaustive correlation rules
that would be tedious and error prone to enumerate by hand.
The transformation relies on a detailed description of various
aspects of the real execution environment (topology of the
system, deployed services, etc.). Consequently, the generated
correlation rules are tightly linked to the characteristics of the
monitored information system. The proposed transformation
process has been implemented in a prototype that generates
correlation rules expressed in an attack description language.
Keywords-Security and Protection; Intrusion detection;
I. INTRODUCTION
An alert correlation system aims at exploiting the known
relationships between some elements that appear in the
flow of low level notifications to generate high semantic
meta-alerts. The main goal is to reduce the number of
alerts returned to the security administrator and to allow
a higher level analysis of the situation. However, producing
correlation rules is a highly difficult operation, as it requires
both the knowledge of an attacker, and the knowledge of the
functionalities of all IDSes involved in the detection process.
This paper focuses on the transformation process that allows
to translate the description of a complex attack scenario
into correlation rules. Obviously, the first phase (i.e., the
identification of the elementary actions that compose the
attack scenario) requires the knowledge of a human expert.
In this work, we assume that this specification relies on
attack trees [7]. These structures are extended to identify
the elementary actions that compose a multi-step attack.
This hierarchical formalism allows to describe the logical
relations between elementary actions and to indicate some
temporal constraints between them.
From this extended attack tree, we define a transformation
process for the creation of correlation rules. The sequen-
tial transformations take progressively into account various
information about the execution context. Our correlation
rules generator needs two kinds of information that can be
provided by two kinds of independent experts. Some experts
provide information about attack scenarios while the others
provide information on the execution environment. Thus the
areas of expertise that should be required for each of them
is smaller. The initial representation of an attack has to be as
compact and as general as possible while the resulting set of
correlation rules has to be specific to a concrete environment.
The goal is to ensure that this analysis remains valid even
if the environment evolves from time to time. The expert
has only to describe the main steps and characteristics of
a complex attack without identifying neither the possible
targeted nodes, nor the possible observations that may lead
to detect that a given step of this attack has occurred.
Section II presents an overview of our approach for
automatically generating correlation rules. Section III il-
lustrates our starting point with an example. Section IV
defines the notion of action tree and Section V describes the
steps required to transform an action tree into a correlation
tree. Section VI reviews the related works and Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. FROM ATTACK TREES TO CORRELATION RULES
The generation process is divided into five steps (See Fig-
ure 1). Among the five steps, four can be entirely automated
by using data stored in a knowledge base. Only the first
step requires the involvement of a human expert during the
transformation process. An attack tree (provided by a human
expert) is the starting point of our transformation process.
This tree includes the operators defined in [1] (OR, AND,
SAND). The attack scenario can be completely generic (in
that case, the attack tree describes the steps of a known
attack) or specific to the information system to be monitored.
The first step consists in transforming the attack tree into
an action tree. An attack tree cannot be used directly as
input to an automated transformation process because its
description is too informal and because it refers only to
goals and sub goals of the attack. The rewriting operated by
the expert addresses these two problems. Broadly, the built
action tree is quite similar to what has been proposed in [1]:
an action is associated with each leaf node. Obviously, any
implicit information must be explicit in the action tree. An
action description language (detailed later in Section IV) is
a cornerstone in the proposed transformation process.
Figure 1. Transformation process of attack an tree to correlation rules: steps and used structures
The purpose of the next steps is to adapt the action tree
to the specificities of the monitored information system by
using information from the knowledge base. The second
step aims at identifying the actors of the different actions
(i.e., the hosts that can be the source or the target of an
action). For each action of the action tree and for each
unspecified host, the cartography (installed softwares and
services) provided by the knowledge base is used to find the
possible hosts. For example, if the action is a basic attack’s
step, only the hosts where a vulnerable process is running are
considered. The third step aims at identifying observers that
have the opportunity to observe the specified actions. Again
the discovery process relies on the knowledge base which
contains information about the different sensors, NIDS and
HIDS. More details are provided in the Subsection V-B.
The fourth step consists in transforming the action tree
with observers into a correlation tree that describes the
observable events that can be used to detect the whole attack
scenario. IDSes and sensors will respectively raise alerts or
send messages to the correlation system. This step is fully
described in the Subsection V-C. During the fifth step of the
process, the correlation rules are generated so that they can
be included in the available correlation system. This step
involves mostly syntax translations.
The generation process explained above relies on a
knowledge base describing the monitored system and the
deployment of the sensors and IDSes in this system. This
description takes into account the topology of the network
(the sub-networks where the nodes are placed, their ad-
dresses), the cartography (which services, processes and
softwares are running on each node) and the different sensors
monitoring the system. Some ontologies-based models ([4],
[2]) have been proposed as a knowledge base and can fulfill
partially these requirements. We choose to use a knowledge
base that extends M4D4 ([4]) because most of the objects
and relationships we have to model are already taken into
account. This framework is built upon a Prolog engine,
which enables the definition of facts and rules in the same
language.
III. INTRODUCING A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE
A. System architecture
(a) Network topology
(b) Attack scenario to steal confidential information
(c) Subset of a global attack
Figure 2. Topology and attack trees
In order to illustrate our approach, we propose to apply
each step in the context of an example. The reference system
is shown on Figure 2a. For the sake of simplicity, our
example is limited to the sub-part surrounded with the dotted
rectangle (with the minimal number of machines required
to run the scenario). The gateway firewall g1 makes the
public DMZ (identified by dmz in Figure 2a) accessible from
the outside but does not authorize any connection from the
outside world or from the DMZ to the internal subnetwork.
However, the internal network and the DMZ can access
the internet. The DMZ contains two hosts s1 and s2 that
run different services. Both hosts run web servers that are
accessible from the internet. They also act as file servers
by hosting FTP services. These services are only accessible
from the internal network. The internal network is composed
of two clients c1 and c2 and a file server s3 which is only
accessible from the internal network. The role of s3 consists
in storing confidential files.
We can define the topology and cartography of this
system with facts defined in an extension of M4D4. In our
implementation, such information is represented in the form
of Prolog facts and can be accessed through queries. For
example, the IP address of the node s1 is defined with
node_address(s1, ipv4(10,0,0,1)).
B. Attack Tree Example
We suppose that an external attacker wants to steal some
valuable information stored in the internal server s3. One
possible scenario could consist in the following steps: as
the attacker can only access the subnetwork dmz, its attack
strategy consists in compromising one of the DMZ server
in order to place a trojan horse then one user in the
internal network will access this malicious file, and thus will
compromise his machine in the internal network. The attack
tree describing one possible multi-step attack is illustrated
in Figure 2b. In order to illustrate our approach, we will
focus on a small part of this attack tree, which consists in a
possible attack to upload the initial trojan to the public DMZ
server. This attack consists in a sequence of two actions: a
code injection that is followed to a connection to the attacker
machine. This small attack is described by the attack tree
on Figure 2c.
IV. ACTION TREE
This section focuses on how an action tree can be derived
from an attack tree by describing (1) each elementary action
and (2) how these actions can be linked together.
A. Action Description Language
The attacker actions are specified using an action descrip-
tion language that describes the action and its actors (source
and target). Each action is defined by its name. The possible
names are identified in the following paragraph. An action
can require to define the source and target of the action. This
information constitutes the attributes of the action and are
defined in the following.
Action Naming Convention: Elementary actions of an
attack tree can be split in two categories: they can be attacks,
which means that they match a known attack class, or
they can be normal actions which are considered malicious
only within the context of the scenario as a whole. As a
consequence, we choose an appropriate naming convention
for each of these two categories.
As actions that refer to attacks should refer to known
categories of attacks, we need an attack taxonomy in order
to name attacks. Among the taxonomies which have been
proposed, CAPEC1 (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration
and Classification) seems to be a suitable choice. Indeed, this
taxonomy takes into account about 400 attack patterns orga-
nized in about 70 different categories. This taxonomy is built
from 15 main attack mechanisms (from Data Leakage At-
tacks to Supply chain Attacks). Each of these mechanisms is
then subdivided into other attack mechanisms until it reaches
elementary attack patterns that compose the leaves of the
CAPEC tree. During the definition of the knowledge base,
this organization allows to express general mechanisms of
attacks which may encompass several more detailed attack
patterns. During the specification of an action, the chosen
name of an attack action has to correspond to the name of the
common ancestor attack mechanism that includes potentially
all the attack patterns the attacker can perform. This enables
us to specify an action with a variable level of precision.
However, choosing a too general attack mechanism may lead
to false positives, whereas choosing a too specific attack
pattern may lead to false negatives. In our example, the first
leaf is an attack action labelled Injection attack. Injection is
one of the root attack mechanism provided by CAPEC. It
is sub-classed in 17 different attack categories (from remote
code inclusion to SQL injection). We can decide to stop
here and choose injection for the name of the action. But
if the context gives more restrictions about the possible
attacks, we can for example choose the injection sub-class
command injection and consequently reject all other types
of injections.
Actions which are not attacks by themselves are supposed
to be normal system actions. Common system actions are
referenced in the CEE2 (Common Event Expression) tax-
onomy. CEE goal is to standardize the representation of
logs. Consequently, it provides system primitives including
a list of elementary actions which can be performed in a
system. Contrary to CAPEC, the action taxonomy is reduced
to a simple list of terms. In our example, the second leaf
describes an outgoing connection, which can be described
by the action initiate.
Attributes: The description of an action should allow
to decide if the action is observable on the system, and how
this observation can be performed. In order to answer these
questions, it is necessary to know at different observation
levels (network, system, application) if the action is visible.
In practice, to answer this question, it is necessary to
know if an attack is remote (and involves packets on the
1http://capec.mitre.org/
2http://cee.mitre.org
(a) Action tree
Figure 3. Action description language
network), or if it is local (and is locally observable). To
provide this information, we decided to define two attributes:
source and target. The source and the target have locations
and IP addresses on the network. If these attributes are equal,
the attack is local to a node. Moreover, an action has always
an impact on an entity on the system: this entity can be a
file, a service listening on a port, or a process. A file is
completely determined by its file name. A process has a
name, and runs with the rights of a user (that is defined by
his name and his user id). This set of attributes is sufficient to
know what level of the system is targeted by the attack. It is
important to note that each attribute of the action description
has a type. If one of these attributes is represented by a
variable, this variable inherits from the type of the attributes
it represents.
B. Variable or constant attributes
The attack scenario consists of several actions with differ-
ent kinds of attributes: some of them are constant and loosely
coupled with the system characteristics and are known
before the attack occurs. Some others are in the defender
zone and are strongly coupled with the system topology and
configuration. Finally, some attributes are under the control
of the attacker, which means that their values cannot be
determined before an attack occurs and can change for each
attack instance. These several kinds of attributes conduct
to the definition of the nature of each attribute: it is either
constant or variable and variable attributes can be divided
in two categories: static and dynamic.
Constant Attributes: An attribute is constant when its
value is constant for all instances of the described attack
(e.g., the network in which the web servers are located).
This constant has the type of the attribute and can be used
to define a value which is known to be an attack invariant. In
the example Figure 3a, the target.location of the left action
is always the dmz, as it is the only part of the network that
is reachable by the external attacker.
Variable Attributes: An attribute must be represented
by a variable when its value can vary depending on the
instance of the attack. We can then distinguish two categories
of variables: the variable whose possible values can be
enumerated knowing the system configuration (topology,
cartography, etc.), and the variables that take values com-
pletely independently of the system. The first category of
variables is called static variable, and the second category
is called dynamic variable. The category of each variable is
defined in the declaration part of the variables.
In the example Figure 3a, the target.address of the action
is one of the two servers in the DMZ. As a consequence,
the target.address attribute is a variable whose values is
in the set {10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2}. This set can be completely
enumerated using the knowledge of our network. This at-
tribute is thus a static variable. On the contrary, the value
of the source.address attribute of the left action cannot be
guessed uniquely by relying on the knowledge of the system
topology. This attribute will take a value only during the
execution of the attack: it will be the IP address of the
attacker machine. This attribute is thus a dynamic variable.
Relations between actions: A variable that has been
declared in the variable declaration part can be used in
several actions if necessary, as long as it is used for attributes
of the same type. In the example Figure 3a, the variable
Att (whose value is the IP address of the attacker machine)
describes both the source.address of the left action and the
target.address of the right action. This is a way to define that
the value of the attribute source.address of the left action is
equal to the attribute target.address of the right action.
V. AUTOMATIC GENERATION OF CORRELATION TREE
A. Taking into account the target system
The purpose of this second step is to translate the generic
action tree defined in IV-A into an action tree specific to the
targeted system.
Action tree transformations: During this step all at-
tributes parameters with static variables will be identified
thanks to suitable requests to the knowledge base. These
requests rely on a connection between the action attributes
and the predicates that describe the different actors. This
instantiation is subdivided in two operations. The first op-
eration produces the list of all the possible trees given the
information available in the knowledge base and the second
operation merges these trees into a single one.
The first operation produces a list of trees whose action
parameters previously defined with a static variable will be
instantiated. Each time a static variable can receive more
than one value, a new tree is created. As a consequence,
each output tree reflects one possible specific attack tree in
our current system. Then, given that all these trees refer to
Figure 4. Actors identification
the same attack scenario, we consider that only one attack
tree should include them. Therefore, a new common OR root
node is added to link all these trees.
Illustration: Given the action tree of the previous
section, the system will request the address, service port and
process related to a running service for all nodes located
in the DMZ. Moreover, when the two actions are remote
actions, the filtering rules of the gateway will be taken into
account. Indeed, the gateway allows external nodes to only
access ports 80 and 8080 respectively of servers s1 and
s2. Then, the services (and the related softwares and users
information) associated to each of these ports for each server
will be identified. Given the cartography of our example,
two servers (s1 and s2) will be identified as potential actors.
Consequently, the static variables will take these specific
values, resulting in two trees (one dedicated for each server)
that will be merged as shown in Figure 4.
B. Who can observe the actions?
This step focuses on selecting suitable observers for each
actor. An observer is any device able to provide information
about system or network events. They can be a simple
sensor or a sophisticated IDS. During this step, a new
parameter will be added to each action. This parameter will
associate each action to its set of potential observers. A
potential observer of a specific action is an observer for
which the topological visibility and the functional visibility
are compatible with the action specification. The topological
visibility of an observer refers to the set of actors it can mon-
itor and its functional visibility refers to the type of action
it can detect based on its configuration. These definitions
extend those provided in [4].
The topological visibility of an observer can be a network
or a node. Consequently, an action involving only one node
can be potentially only observed by a HIDS or a local sensor,
while actions involving two different nodes can be observed
by local and remote sensors. The selection of all observers
providing a suitable topological visibility is achieved in two
stages: first, all suitable host-based sensors are selected.
Then, the suitable network sensors are selected based on the
possible routes between the source and target of the action.
Then, we suppose that an observer can detect specific
actions. The functional visibility is hence related to the name
action field describing the type of action. The functional
visibility is modeled by a double association. Each sensor
is linked to a detection configuration and each detection
configuration is linked to the type of attack or actions it
can detect. Hence, the selection of observers given their
functional visibility can be split in two cases. When the
action refers to an attack class, all sensors able to detect
one of the sub-classes or parent-classes of this action in the
CAPEC taxonomy are selected. Indeed, a sensor can produce
an alert referring to an attack which is a subclass of the
specified action or it can produce a more generic alert. When
the action is a common event (whose name is issued from
CEE), all sensors whose configuration can observe the action
are selected. These selections are illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Action tree enriched with observers
C. From action tree to correlation tree
The goal of this section is to explain how the structure
defined in Figure 5 can be transformed into a correlation tree,
i.e., a structure describing only observables (called messages
in our context) that can be used to detect an attack against
the system. Three mechanisms are required to describe this
step: how we describe messages produced by sensors, how
an action is transformed into messages for a given sensor and
how messages are managed when several sensors monitor
the same action.
Message model: In our model, each message is com-
posed of two parts: the message format and a set of fields.
The format identifies the real format in which the message
will be generated at run-time. The set of fields expresses the
information that the message actually contains.
Converting actions to messages: This step takes into
account the subset of attributes that messages generated by
a given sensor can really include. As an example, a network
sensor can generate messages containing IP source address,
IP destination address, source and destination port values,
but these messages will probably not include process or
user related information. In addition, a given sensor can
potentially produce different messages for a given action.
For example, an IDS can provide different signatures for
detecting sub-classes of a specific attack class. In this case,
the possible messages are joined by an OR operator, meaning
that we assume the action occurs if at least one of the
messages is raised. When several sensors can detect the same
action, we consider the possible messages for each of them.
Then, they are joined together with an OR operator. As a
consequence, the action will be successful if at least one
sensor detects it.
Illustration: Figure 6 shows the correlation tree result-
ing from the identification of the sensor generated messages.
The tree is non-symmetrical because the servers s1 and s2
are monitored by a different set of sensors. In our case,
two Snort signatures match the injection action and have
respectively the signature id 22063 and 22064.
Figure 6. Correlation tree
VI. RELATED WORK
In the explicit alert correlation field, works focus mainly
on the efficiency of detection algorithms and less in the
configuration of these correlation systems with attack sce-
nario. However some techniques we used in our approach
to generate correlation rules are similar to those of systems
built for different purpose.
The works [8] and [5] use a model of the supervised
system (including network services, host reachabilities and
known vulnerabilities). However, their purpose is not to
generate rules but to check the accuracy of received alerts
at run time. They also propose different solutions to model
alerts. [8] defines alert type but without relying on an
existing taxonomy. The approach [5] proposes a way to map
alert generated by Snort with their defined attack scenario.
It consists in a manual mapping between Snort signatures
and Nessus vulnerability identifiers.
Some works on correlation use an attack graph as input
attack scenario ([3], [6]). These graphs are automatically
generated but take only known vulnerabilities referenced in
the system into account. In general, method relying on attack
graph can only take into account attack paths exploiting
known and automatically identified vulnerabilities, whereas
our approach allows a more global description without
needing to know each vulnerability on each host. From our
point of view, our approach is complementary, as attack
tree could be built from information extracted from attack
graphs.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we introduce a method for generating
correlation rules from an attack scenario and a knowledge
base. In order to reach this goal, we have defined an action
description language to specify each elementary action and
we have built an extension of the knowledge base M4D4.
The benefits of this approach are twofold: first, it decouples
the required expert knowledges for creating correlation rules
in three low coupled domains (attack scenario specification,
system cartography and sensor modeling). Then the evo-
lutions of the system are more easily taken into account.
Indeed, suitable changes involving cartography or sensors
have to be made in the knowledge base to reflect the system
evolutions. Then, these changes will be taken into account
during a re-generation of the correlation rules.
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